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ABSTRACT
STEVEN M. WHEAT: The Revenge ofthe Past: Ethnic Nationalism, Soviet
Nationalities Policies, and the Collapse ofthe USSR
(Under the direction of Oliver Dinius)

The Soviet Union was a vast empire that included scores of ethnic minority
groups, From its earliest days, the Soviet government was compelled to find creative
ways to address the concerns of these various groups while remaining true to its
ideological rhetoric. This paper outlines many ofthe governmental programs that aimed
to appease minority groups through cultural, linguistic, and in some cases, administrative
autonomy. The numerous instances in Soviet history during which these privileges were
curtailed are also included. In sum,this paper presents a chronological review ofthe
various, often contradictory, nationalities policies adopted in the Soviet Union from the
earliest times to the collapse in 1991.
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Steven M. Wheat
The Revenge ofthe Past:
Ethnic Nationalism, Soviet Nationalities Policies, and
the Collapse ofthe USSR

Part I: Introduction
The Nationality Question
The Soviet Union was a multiethnic empire that encompassed nearly 100 ethnic
minority groups, each representing a variety of historical and cultural traditions, in
addition to national languages.' This wide array of ethnic groups included large nations
such as the Ukrainians and Kazakhs, as well as smaller groups, including the Chuvash
and the Bashkir.^ This thesis traces the history of the Soviet government’s policies
towards these ethnic minorities. These nationalities policies encompassed primarily the
promotion of national cultures and languages, in addition to opening greater educational
opportunities and administrative positions to ethnic minorities. Furthermore, Soviet
nationalities policies attempted to manage the dilemma posed by ethnic nationalism.
The Soviet penchant to vacillate between two policies is the focal point ofthe
present study. Ethnic nationalism in the USSR was at certain points in time tolerated
and, for a while, even promoted by the Soviet regime. The Soviets in the late 1920s and
early 1930s pursued korenizatsia, a policy of encouraging what Yuri Slezkine calls
„3

“ethnic particularism.

In addition to cultivating national cultures and languages under

korenizatsia, the Soviets demarcated distinct territorial boundaries for each ethnic group.

'Jeremy R. Azrael, ed. Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices,(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1978),
250.
Mbid,314-315.
^ Yuri Slezkine,“The Soviet Union as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic
Particularism,” in Sheila Fitzpatrick, ed., Stalinism: Ne^v Directions(New York; Routledge, 2000), 313.
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After uniting ethnic minority groups on territorial, cultural and linguistic bases, the Soviet
government sought to integrate these minority groups into a cohesive nation, or Sovetskii
narod. Ethnic minorities came to perceive these attempts at building a cohesive nation as
Russification, leading to a cumulative growth ofethnic dissent.
However,this strategy of korenizatsia, which allowed considerable cultural,
administrative, and at times, economic, autonomy to minority groups ran contrary to the
principles of Marxism-Leninism in the eyes of many Soviet leaders. Karl Marx certainly
would have disapproved of korenizatsia^ as he believed that differences between peoples
should be disappearing rather than being encouraged. Marx asserted that “national
differences and antagonisms between peoples are vanishing gradually from day to day,”
and that “the supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster,

This

conflict between Marxist ideology and the pragmatic exigencies faced by the early Soviet
regime led to an intense debate within the Communist Party. As a result of this
dichotomy, the nationalities policies ofthe USSR vacillated between korenizatsia and a
strategy of Russification.
How to cope with the so-called “nationality question” was a constant source of
debate throughout the history of the Soviet Union. At certain points in time, such as
during the early fledgling years ofthe USSR,the Soviets were compelled to adopt more
lenient nationalities policies towards ethnic minorities for pragmatic reasons. Obviously,
the early Bolshevik regime needed to secure as much support from ethnic minorities as
possible, which it promoted on the premise of national self-determination and anti-

Ronald Grigor Suny, The Revenge ofthe Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse ofthe Soviet
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 17.
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imperialist propaganda. Thus, promises of cultural and linguistic autonomy were given
to ethnic minority groups in return for their submission to Bolshevik rule.
By laying out the various programs and policies that the Soviet government
enacted towards the various ethnic minorities of the USSR over the course ofthe roughly
70 years of its existence as well as their shortcomings and, often, utter failures, the
precarious circumstances to which ethnic minorities were exposed can be readily shown.
A particularly ubiquitous problem with Soviet nationality policy was in its treatment of
ethnic languages in the schools of each respective republic. At certain times, the Soviets
allowed schools to instruct students in the ethnic language of the republic, while at other
times, native-language schools were compelled to begin instructing almost entirely in
Russian.
Along with the inconsistency of Soviet nationalities policies over the years, ethnic
minorities were also subjected to intermittent periods of mass deportations and violent
suppression at the hands of the Soviet government. Stalin’s expulsion campaigns against
those feared to be in collaboration with Nazi Germany contributed greatly toward ethnic
minorities’ distrust ofthe Great Russians and the collective memory ofsuch instances
undermined later attempts to create a Sovetskii narod. The subsequent periods of
Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and even Gorbachev all saw the Soviet military suppress
demonstrations by ethnic minorities in areas of the Baltics, Central Asia, and the
Caucasus. Under Gorbachev, what had been silent dissent among ethnic minorities
became calls for national self-determination. Thus, the failure of Soviet nationalities
policies to construct either a multiethnic or a cohesive nation-state ultimately contributed
to the collapse of the USSR.

Wheat 4

Defining the Nation
The historian Anthony Smith provides a useful definition ofthe nation. After
noting a distinction between the ‘nation’ and the ‘ethnic community,’ Smith simplifies
the term ‘ethnic community’ into the French ethnic. Smith then characterizes ethnie as
“a named human population with myths ofcommon ancestry, shared historical memories,
one or more elements of shared culture, a link with a homeland, and a measure of
«5

solidarity, at least among the elites,

A major distinction between ethnics and nations is

that ethnics are often defined by ancestry myths and historical memories, while nations
are typically defined by their historic territory, public cultures, and adherence to common
laws. Moreover, nations must possess a homeland, a condition not necessarily true of
ethnics.^
Smith notes a second major factor in the development of national identities, which
he calls invented traditions. This trend began in the 1870s in Europe and continues to be
in effect today. Examples of these kinds ofearly invented traditions are national sporting
contests and festivals. These invented traditions were deliberately created in order to
bring about a sense of national consciousness. Smith goes on to write.
They are sociopolitical constructs forged, even fabricated, by cultural engineers
who design symbols, mythologies, rituals, and histories specifically to meet
modern mass needs. Not only were entirely new symbols, like flags and anthems,
created but also ‘historic continuity had to be invented, for exarnple by creating an
ancient past beyond effective historical continuity either by semifiction... or by
forgery.’(Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983)These constructs make up a large part of
what we mean by nations and national identities.

^ Anthony D. Smith, The Nation in History: Historiographical Debates about Ethnicity and Nationalism
(Hanover: University Press of New England, 2000), 65.
^ Ibid, 65.
’Ibid, 53.
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This sort of“creation,” or at the very least encouragement, of national consciousness by
deliberate efforts can be seen in the Soviet Union with its nationalities policies.
The manner in which the early Bolshevik leaders defined ethnic groups can be
distinguished into four major classifications. The first group was made up ofethnies
considered to be sufficiently developed to establish nation-states. This category included
groups such as the Poles and Finns who had experienced long-term periods of
sovereignty, as well as groups such as the Georgians, Armenians, Estonians, Latvians,
and Lithuanians, all of whom had experienced brief periods of independence. The
second group was comprised of groups that the Bolsheviks considered to be wrought
under the competing influences of national consciousness and social divisions, and that
they were thus not ready to establish nation-states. Specific groups under this category
included the Ukrainians, the Belorussians, and the Azerbaijanis. The third group was
made up ofthe ethnies of Central Asia who, despite having a sense of ethnic community,
had never made the transition to nationhood. Lastly, the fourth group consisted ofethnies
either too small or too undeveloped to seek national independence or to even possess a
separate national existence. This category included the vast majority ofsmall ethnic
groups located inside the boundaries ofthe Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic,
also referred to as the RSFSR [1917-1991]. The distinction between the third and fourth
groups would be the basis on which the Bolsheviks designated union and autonomous
republics.
Two prominent schools ofthought on the origins of nationalism are the
primordialists and the instrumentalists. Primordialists tend to focus on the strong

* Ben Fowkes, The Disintegration ofthe Soviet Union: A Study in the Rise and Triumph ofNationalism
(New York; St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 35-36.
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emotional attachments that accompany ethno-national revivals while explaining such
sentiments as consequences of“the deep-rooted, almost ‘natural’ quality ofethnic
»9

belonging,

Primordial theories of nationalism stress the importance of immediate

kinship ties, along with senses of belonging within a particular religious community.
10

speaking a particular language, and following certain social practices,

In contrast.

instrumentalists characterize ethnic and national identity “not as a primordial constant.
but as a social construct.

Moreover, instrumentalists see this social construct as a

consequence of modernization and as such, believe that ethnic and national identities can
12

be repeatedly created and recreated,

Such was the belief ofthe Soviet regime, which

under Stalin attempted to recreate and redefine ethnie cultures along socialist lines under
korenizatsia. His successors endeavored to construct a new, Soviet identity to redefine
and replace earlier notions of ethnie.
Bollerup and Christenson include the notion of cultural deprivation, or felt
colonization, and fear of future cultural deprivation as primordial interests of ethnies.
The probability of conflict between ethnies, according to the argument, increases where
“both groups...have an antagonistic history of interaction, and feel or fear cultural
„13

deprivation caused by the opposing nation-group,

These two primordialist conditions

fit the case of the USSR quite nicely, as each were among the primary causes of conflict
between the Soviet government and the various ethnies living within its borders.

’Seren Rinder Bollerup, and Christian Dons Christensen, Nationalism in Eastern Europe: Causes and
Consequences ofthe National Revivals and Conflicts in Late Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe(New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 36.
10
Ibid, 39.
Ibid, 40.
Ibid, 40.
Ibid, 184.
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The instrumentalist Soviets alternated between promoting two conceptions of
nation-building: between Sovietization, an approach rising out ofterritorial and citizen’s
concepts of nationalism, and korenizatsia, which arose from the cultural nationalism
notion of ethnie. In practice, Sovietization meant Russification, as the Soviets’ attempt at
consolidating the nation under a common Sovetskii narodtook a distinctly Russian tone.
This strategy of nation-building encountered resistance from ethnic minorities, who
instead sought to achieve political autonomy for their respective ethnics. This ethnie
resistance eventually won out, as Sovietization ultimately failed with the collapse ofthe
USSR.

Part II: Soviet Nationality Policies
Early Soviet Nationality Policies
During the late 1920s and early 1930s, the policy of korenizatsia allowed the
Soviets to construct what Terry Martin calls an “affirmative action empire in which the
government responded to mounting ethnic nationalism by granting certain privileges to
republics dominated by a non-Russian ethno-linguistic group. The Soviet government
promoted the national consciousness of each ethnic minority and set up many regional
and local governmental structures to accommodate desires for greater local autonomy.
This model of government has been dubbed ‘ethnofederalism’ in that the Soviet state
“recognized and accepted multiethnicity as a guiding principle of social and political
life.vl4 The Bolsheviks allowed national minorities to have, in theory, political and
cultural autonomy within the USSR under the sole leadership of the Communist Party.
Mark R. Beissinger, Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse ofthe Soviet State (Cambridge;
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 50-51.
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The Soviets organized larger ethnic groups such as the Uzbeks and the Ukrainians into
union republics, while granting regional autonomy in the form ofsub-republic units to
15

smaller groups such as the Chechens and the Ingush.
The Soviet government undertook a variety ofcampaigns in the late 1920s and
early 1930s in an effort to promote national consciousnesses among ethnic minorities.
Local languages, for instance, became an official governmental language in each ethnic
region. However, several ethnic groups’ languages had become so antiquated that they
lacked a written form. In these cases, new forms of writing were created as a result ofthe
korenizatsia policies. Another key aspect ofthis process was that the Soviet government
sponsored a variety of cultural products in these often newly revived languages such as
16

books,journals, newspapers, and museums,

Other examples include ethno-national
17

museums, opera houses, and television stations,

The government tolerated all national

and ethnic cultures in this manner as long as, according to Stalin, they remained “national
in form and socialist in content.»I8 Each technically autonomous republic received
symbols of independent states including a national flag, anthem, and parliament for each
republic. This was a particularly radical policy given the Soviet Union’s ideological
19

obligation, at least in theory, to promote an egalitarian nation free from divisiveness.
Why would the Soviet Union pursue such a radical policy that seems to promote
devolution rather than the strict centralization that the USSR strived for? Much ofthe

Levon Chorbajian,“The Nationalities Question in the Former Soviet Union: Transcaucasia, the Baltics,
and Central Asia,” in Berch Berberoglu, ed.. The National Question: Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and
Self-Determination in the 20f^ Century(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995), 228.
Terry Martin,“An Affirmative Action Empire: The Soviet Union as the Highest Form of Imperialism,
in Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry Martin, eds., A State ofNations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of
Lenin and Stalin(New York: Oxford University Press, 2001),67.
’’ Chorbajian, 229.
Robert Weinberg,Stalin's Forgotten Zion: Birobidzhan and the Making ofa Soviet Jewish Homeland
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 15.
Chorbajian, 229.
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reasoning behind these policies had to do with Bolshevik rhetoric leading up to and
during the Revolution of 1917. The Bolsheviks sought to bring about a sense of‘class
solidarity’ that would replace ethnic interests. Needless to say, this endeavor would
require a comprehensive policy geared toward national minorities. The official
Communist Party policy was announced during the Second Congress of 1903, which
decreed.
equal rights for all citizens, irrespective ofsex, religion, race and nationality, as
well as the right ofthe population to receive and education in its own
language...the introduction of native language on equal terms with the State
language in all local, public and state institutions. Finally, the right of selfdetermination for all nations comprising the state...
Several of Vladimir Lenin’s early writings deal with what he calls the “oppressed
nations,” or groups who had long suffered at the hands of tsarist imperialism. Imperial
nationalities policies overtly promoted Russification, as evidenced by Minister of Popular
Education D. A. Tolstoi’s 1870 statement that, “the final goal ofthe education of all the
inorodtsy [non-Russian peoples]...must be their russification and amalgamation with the
Russian people.

The imperial regime also created a legal distinction between

inorodtsy and prirodnye [“natural residents,” i.e. Great Russians], rendering ethnic
minorities second-class citizens.22 Lenin felt that for the Soviets to ignore their previous
rhetoric and to continue to subjugate the newly founded Soviet Union’s various ethnic
groups to the same suppression as under the Russian Empire would have made them
hypocrites.^^ At the same time, many Bolsheviks, including Lenin, were distrustful of

20

Dina Zisserman-Brodsky, Constructing Ethnopolitics in the Soviet Union: Samizdat. Deprivation, and
the Rise ofEthnic Nationalism(New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2003), 20.
Andreas Kappeler, The Russian Empire: A Multi-Ethnic History(London: Pearson Education Limited,
2001), 262.
22
Ibid, 170-171.
Slezkine, 313.
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ethnic nationalism to the point that they made certain to organize the republics into non
ethnic geographic units which allowed minorities to claim a republic as their own, yet
would allow for an ethnically diverse society to undermine the “false consciousness of
nationalism.»24
The Soviets chose to take this path of korenizatsia with regards to ethnic
minorities out of the simple fear that they would come to see themselves as oppressed
under Soviet rule and would thus seek to challenge it. Ethnic minorities had become an
important basis of legitimacy for the Bolsheviks in the wake ofthe Civil War. The antiSemitism and Great Russian chauvinism ofthe Whites had driven numerous ethnic
25

minorities into support for the Red Army during the Civil War.

There was also a

pervasive view among the Bolshevik leadership that many ofthe nations within the
Soviet Union were essentially “backward,” both economically and culturally. While
korenizatsia was meant to address these issues, it seemed to many Bolsheviks to run
contrary to the principles of Marxism in that it concentrated on promoting ethno-national
interests rather than the interest ofthe proletariat. These critics contended that class
struggle should be the primary focus in the republics, not cultural policies which seemed
to reinforce the ethno-nationalist bourgeoisie. Lenin and Stalin were able to enact their
policy by arguing that national movements were a “necessary evil” of sorts that would
have to be accepted until ethnic minorities could catch up to the Great Russians
26

economically and culturally.

"Chorbajian, 228.
Christopher Read, From Tsar to Soviets: The Russian People and their Revolution, 1917-1921. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1996),7.
^^Slezkine, 315-317.
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The Bolsheviks showed a great deal ofconcern over the question of ethnic
groups, and with good reason. Traditional nationalist rivalries with groups such as the
Finns, the Poles and the Ukrainians were revived during the early years of Bolshevik rule,
leading Lenin to fear that an uprising by these groups could threaten the newly founded
Soviet Union. Bolshevik leaders, including Lenin, felt that ethnic nationalism was
dangerous because it could be manipulated by bourgeois leaders to their advantages.
This view of nationalism as a masking ideology engendered deep distrust in many Soviet
leaders, and explains why Soviet ethnic policies often vacillated. Lenin’s followers
considered ethnic national consciousness to be an inevitable stage in human history and
that as such, the Soviet government should do its best to try and steer the course ofthat
inevitability. Moreover, Lenin accepted that many ethnic minorities were justified in
27

their distrust of Russians after years of oppression at the hands ofthe tsarist regimes.
Lenin expounded on the dilemma posed by the perception of Great Russian
chauvinism:
The Bashkirs do not trust the Great Russians because the Great Russians are
more cultured and used to take advantage oftheir culture to rob the Bashkirs. So
in those remote places the name ‘Great Russian’ stands for ‘oppressor’ and
‘cheat.’ We should take this into account. We should fight against this. But it is a
long term thing. It cannot be abolished by decree. We should be very careful
here. And a nation like the Great Russians should be particularly careful because
they have provoked such bitter hatred in all the other nations.”
Indeed, Russians overwhelmingly staffed most ofthe local government agencies in the
Soviet republics, and Russian laborers dominated skilled occupations in these areas. In
the republic of Dagestan in 1929, for instance, only 25.3 percent of employees at the

Ronald Grigor Suny, and Terry Martin, eds., A State ofNations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of
Lenin and Stalin(New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 68-71.
Quoted in Slezkine, 316.
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government headquarters were from ethnic groups indigenous to Dagestan,

Similarly,

in the Bashkir Autonomous Republic, only 8.1 percent of the state apparatus’ staff was
ethnically Bashkir, while those of Baskir descent only comprised 10.5 percent of laborers
30

in heavy industry,

In order to combat this perception of Great Russian chauvinism

among ethnic minorities, the Soviet regime under Stalin encouraged ethnic minorities to
take skilled jobs and government positions under the “affirmative action” policies of
korenizatsia. The policy also granted considerable cultural, linguistic, and administrative
autonomy.
The freedoms granted to ethnic minorities under korenizatsia would have clear
limits, and would prove temporary. While in many cases the Soviets allowed schools to
utilize their regional language as the primary language of instruction, they had no control
over the rest ofthe curriculum. Many ofthe rights for national minorities which the
Bolsheviks often officially endorsed were not enforced by the early Soviet government or
were even repressed. While maintaining an official line ofthe right ofsecession for
national minorities, the Bolsheviks consistently repressed movements led by groups such
as the Georgians. Stalin even went so far as to declare,“The so-called independence of
the so-called Georgia, Armenia, Poland, Finland, etc., is only an illusion and conceals the
»31

utter dependence of these [weak states] on one group of imperialists or another.

After

1934, Stalin would vastly scale back many ofthe privileges granted to ethnic minorities
during the early years of Bolshevik rule in what has become known as the “Great
Retreat.”

29
30

Zisserman-Brodsky, 22-23.
Ibid, 23.
Ibid, 21.
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Stalin and the Great Retreat
During the early years of Stalin’s rule, the policy ofso called “national liberation
was greatly advanced, allowing him to gain the nickname “father of nations.” In fact, it
was under Stalin that the Great Transformation of 1928-1932 saw the height of state
financing of ethnic diversity

One of the major successes of korenizatsia under Stalin

was the dramatic increase in the number of ethnic minorities studying at the university
level. In Tataria, for instance, the percentage of Tatars attending college increased from
33

14.6 percent in 1927-1928 to 26.3 percent in the 1934-1935 term.

The primary reason

for such gains in minority student recruitment was that the Soviet government during this
time period allowed many universities in the RSFSR to conduct courses in languages
Other than Russian.34 Stalin’s early leniency towards ethnic minorities would not last
long, however, and by the mid 1930s, his nationalities policies would become ruthless.
The policy of korenizatsia was soon replaced by a period of Russification, during
which ethnic minorities were forced to abandon their regional customs and utilize the
Russian language as their primary means of communication. This period oftime during
the mid to late 1930s was known as the “Great Retreat” in which the scope ofthe policies
35

favorable to national minorities were vastly scaled back. In 1934, for instance, the
Sector for National Minorities at the Moscow Regional Soviet and the Commission for
36

Working Among National Minorities, were abolished.

This pattern was to be repeated
37

among the other major urban areas ofthe RSFSR as well.

32

Much more significantly.

Slezkine, 313.
Gerhard Simon, Nationalism and Policy toward the Nationalities in the Soviet Union: From Totalitarian
Dictatorship
to post-Stalinist Society(Oxford, Westview Press 1991), 56.
34
Simon, 56.
35
Slezkine, 313-314.
36
Simon,61.
37
Ibid, 61-62.

33
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between 1937 and 1939, the Soviets dissolved nearly all ofthe national schools, courts,
38

and village soviets,

Muslim areas of Central Asia such as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan

resisted the shift toward Russification for reasons mostly related to religion. During these
Russification campaigns, many Islamic customs were repressed by the Soviets, largely
due to the atheism of Communist ideology. While many in Central Asia had no way to
form any military resistance to the Soviet regime and its policies, they did manage to
39

frustrate the Soviets by “dragging their feet” in implementing reforms.
Education reform was perhaps the major focus of Stalin’s nationality policies, as
Stalin sought to establish Russian as the common language ofthe Red Army. This
educational Russification involved the increasing usage ofthe Russian language in the
schools of several non-Russian speaking republics, along with the gradual phasing out of
the languages of ethnic minorities. Stalin’s early educational policies left the Russian
language instruction in many republics in a very poor state by the late 1930s. Thus it was
decided to make Russian an obligatory subject across the entire Soviet Union, while
Stalin bitterly condemned “bourgeois nationalists” in Central Asia and Ukraine, for
supposedly sabotaging previous efforts to teach Russian in non-Russian schools.

By

1938, Russian language instruction was obligatory in all schools, and national languages
which utilized the Latin or Arabic alphabets had to replace their previous alphabets with
41

Cyrillic.

38

Simon,61.
Douglas Northrop, Veiled Empire: Gender and Power in Stalinist Central Asia (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2004), 276.
40
Peter Blitstein, “Nationbuilding or Russification?: Obligatory Russian Instruction in the Soviet NonRussian School, 1938-1953” in Ronald Suny and Terry Martin, Q^s.^AState ofNations: Empire and
Nation-Making in the Age ofLenin and Stalin(New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 255.
Zisserman-Brodsky, 25.
39
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While these policy shifts may have solved many chronic education problems such
as low numbers of minority students attending higher education, many republic leaders
42

opposed these new policies as forced Russification tactics,

As a result, many republics

implemented the reforms halfheartedly. Stalin remained adamant, however, that the
Russian language be properly taught in all ofthe republics ofthe Soviet Union so that the
43

Soviet military could depend on troops that could communicate in a common language.
While Stalin found it was necessary to promote the Russian language as a practical
solution to a military problem, his successors found that the same was necessary to create
a national Soviet culture, or Sovetskii narod.
By the mid to late 1930s, Stalin’s nationality policies had become ruthless. This
crackdown on ethnic minorities coincided with the rise of Nazi Germany, and was meant
to ensure domestic tranquility while being faced by the external threat offascism. During
the years of the Ezhovshchina, also known as the Great Purge, hundreds ofthousands of
Soviet citizens were systematically deported and imprisoned, often on trumped up
charges of treason. This This series of purges that occurred between 1936 and 1937 had a
devastating effect on ethnic minorities. In 1936, for instance, over 36,000 Poles and
44

7,000 Germans were deported to Kazakhstan,

During this time practically the entire

population of ethnic Koreans, numbering in excess of200,000, was deported back to
Korea.45 In 1937, the Soviets forcefully drove all non-Soviet citizen Chinese back into
China.46 Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn claimed to have been told that anyone in Leningrad
42

Zisserman-Brodsky, 256-257.
Blitstein, 256.
44
Michael Gelb,“Ethnicity During the Ezhovshchina: A Historiography,” in John Morison, ed.. Ethnic and
National Issues in Russian and East European History: Selected Papersfrom the Fifth World Congress of
Central and East European Studies(Warsaw: WCCEES, 1995), 203.
45
Ibid, 193.
46
Ibid, 194.

43
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with an Estonian surname was deported in 1937, while considerable evidence suggests
that thousands of Iranians, Poles, Afghanis, Germans,and Bulgarians were deported on
ethnic grounds.'^^ Stalin’s purges of 1936-1937 indicate a desire to infuse the class
struggle with the problem posed by national minorities. Accordingly, much of Stalin’s
rhetoric on the issue at the time referred to these deported minority groups as ‘exploiter
classes.,48 In reality, the Ezhovshchina was a direct response to the threat posed by Nazi
Germany.
Stalin’s nationality policies targeted Jews in particular. In 1934, the Soviet
government established the Jewish Autonomous Region, also known as Birobidzhan, in
eastern Russia bordering the Chinese region of Manchuria. This was an attempt to deal
with persistent underemployment of Jews in urban areas such as Gomel, where upwards
49

of 70 percent ofjobless individuals were of Jewish descent,

Weinberg notes that the

widespread unemployment experienced by Jews was, in large part, because many oftheir
pre-Revolutionary professions included lease-holding, commerce, and money-lending, all
occupations outlawed under the Soviet government by the early 1930s. Moreover, there
was an upsurge in anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union after the Revolution. Thus, the
issues of unemployment among Jews and mounting anti-Semitism were problems to
50

which the easiest solution seemed to be to encourage Jews to migrate eastward.
Stalin displayed a particular distrust towards ethnic minorities during World War
II, largely out of fear of collaboration with the invading Germans. Large numbers of
certain ethnic groups suffered deportation to Central Asia and Siberia. These purges

47

Gelb, 197.
Zisserman-Brodsky,
25.
49
Weinberg,
16-17.
50
Ibid, 18.
48
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picked up where Stalin left off during the Ezhovshchina, and in many cases went much
further. Over 700,000 Germans were deported from the Soviet Union in 1941 following
51

the Nazi invasion, as well as some 40,000 Lithuanians,

In 1944, Soviet authorities
52

deported 194,000 Crimean Tatars due to suspicion oftheir collaboration,

Stalin’s cruel

policies toward ethnic minorities during the Second World War created a climate in
which many individuals from persecuted ethnic groups would take up arms against their
Soviet oppressors. Seizing upon the weakened position ofthe Soviet government during
the Second World War, many ethnic groups sought to disconnect themselves from the
USSR. Groups from the Baltic republics. Western Ukraine, and the northern Caucasus
region all fought against the Red Army in the form of either guerilla movements or
53

outright allegiance with the Germans,

The Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which reached a
54

strength of over 50,000 troops in 1945, was one such partisan group.

Sizeable anti-

Soviet partisan movements existed in the Baltics as well. Lithuania’s partisans totaled
55

upwards of 30,000, with Latvia and Estonia each boasting roughly 15,000 guerillas.
Ironically, though, the processes of linguistic and ethnic Russification among
national minority groups intensified significantly as a result of World War II. Since the
war claimed the lives of a disproportionate number of minority males, many female
minorities were inclined to marry men from other ethnic groups. Among the national
autonomous republics of the USSR in 1959 there were 572 surviving males, aged 20-24
in 1943, to every 1000 females, while there were 605 Great Russian males per 1000
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females.56 That more minority males perished during the war comes as little surprise,
since a greater proportion of ethnic minority males served in the Red Army infantry than
did their Great Russian comrades. In a sample of200 rifle divisions, about 2.8 percent of
the troops in July 1943 were Kazakh, while as a whole the Kazakhs only made up about
57

1.8 percent of the total population ofthe USSR,

At the same time, about 4.5 percent of

the troops were Uzbek, whereas the Uzbeks made up only about 2.8 percent ofthe total
58

Soviet population.

More remarkably, Ukrainians in July 1944 made up over 33 percent

of the 200 divisions, compared to the total Ukrainian population, which only comprised
roughly 16 percent ofthe total population.^^ Great Russians, in contrast, made up just
over 50 percent of the sample divisions, while comprising nearly 60 percent ofthe Soviet
60

population.

As a result ofthese demographic changes, there was a sharp increase in

linguistic Russification among the ASSR nationalities ofthe RSFSR after 1943.
Having intensified as a result of World War II, Russification continued into the
immediate post-war period. The widespread ethno-national resistance that emerged
during the war did not permeate the postwar period. The Soviet victory and subsequent
international prestige attained by the USSR renewed patriotism amongst Russians and
non-Russians alike and united the country in ways previously unseen. Nonetheless,
isolated patches of ethno-nationalist guerilla resistance remained in the Baltic region as
61

well as Western Ukraine through the late 1950s and early 1960s.

By the late 1940s, the

Soviets had begun an attack on the cultural privileges granted to ethnic minorities under
56
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korenizatsia. Stalin told famed Soviet director Sergei Eisenstein in 1947 that,“We must
«62

overcome the revival of nationalism we are experiencing with all the peoples.

During

the purge known as the Zhdanovschina, the Soviet government waged a war against
supposed “bourgeois nationalism” by altering national cultures, histories, and traditions
to reflect long-standing friendship with the Great Russians.
In late 1946, for instance, the Ukrainian Central Committee issued six resolutions
63

aimed at eradicating “bourgeois-nationalist deviations” in Ukrainian culture.

A number

of Ukrainian historians were purged, including M. Hrushevskyi, for “bourgeoisnationalist” historiography on trumped up charges such as supposedly denying
historically friendly relations between Russia and the Ukraine or rejecting progressive
developments originating in Russia in the realms ofculture, science, and revolutionary
64

thought.

With its resolution “On the Political Errors and Deficiencies in the Work of

the Institute of History at the Academy ofSciences ofthe Ukrainian SSSR,” of August
29, 1947, the Ukrainian Central Committee demanded that other historians criticize the
works of Hrushevskyi and others to emphasize the leading role ofthe Great Russians in
,»65

the “Slavic fight for unity.

Historian Gerhard Simon argues that the zhdanovschina:

“attempted everywhere to fix historical and political consciousness on all-Soviet
values, reduce independent cultural and scientific national traditions, fight against
Western cultural influences, emphasize the close relations between the individual
nations and the Russians since the beginning oftime, present Russian culture as
the superior, leading world civilization to which all other nations look for a
standard.«66
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The Islamic peoples of the USSR experienced particularly strong effects ofthe
zhdanovschina. During the late 1940s, an extensive campaign was lauched to denunciate
and prohibit centuries-old Islamic literary epics. Although Azerbaijani officials affirmed
in 1949 that the Azeri epic Dede-Korkitt was an “outstanding literary and cultural
movement which sings of loyalty,justice, love for the homeland,” two years later Azeri
Party chief A. A. Bagirov declared that the epic “contained the poison of nationalism,”
and that ‘its publication was a gross political mistake committed by the republic
„67

Academy of Sciences.

Most ofthe republics caved under pressure from Moscow, yet

in 1952, the majority in Kirgizia dared to openly resist a Stalinist reinterpretation ofthe
national epic Manas, as Kirgiz and Russian newspapers battled back and forth on how the
epic should be construed. Moscow eventually won, but that many Kirgiz attempted to
defend their cultural privileges afforded to them under previous nationalities policies in
the face of terror speaks volumes about the determination ofethnic minority groups to
68

uphold their respective cultures.

Rather than asserting the merits of national cultures, Soviet nationalities policy
after 1945 trumpeted everything Russian, from Russian art and literature, to Russian
science and history. The notion ofthe Great Russians as the paternalistic majority was
revived, with a prominent Soviet literary journal declaring that the peoples ofthe USSR
view the Russian people as their paragon” and that the peoples of Eastern Europe now
»,69

“look to the Russian people as their older brother,

Stalin himself stated at a reception

for Red Army officers in May, 1945,“1 drink...to the health ofthe Russian people
because it is the most outstanding of all the Soviet Union’s nations...the Soviet Union’s
67
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leading power...because it has a clear mind, a firm character, and patience.

Stalin’s

Russification campaign boasted the eminence and the superiority ofthe Great Russians
on the one hand, while Western culture was vehemently denounced on the other. Soviet
propaganda focused on the supposedly decadent culture ofthe West as well as the alleged
immorality of capitalism.
Much of the rhetoric was aimed at closing offthe USSR during the founding
years of the state of Israel. While the USSR initially recognized Israel with benevolence,
it quickly distanced itself and began extensive campaigns against “Zionism” and
»71

“rootless cosmopolitanism,

This Soviet fear arose from the possibility that the

numerous ethnic minority groups ofthe USSR would come to demand their own
“homelands,” similar to that ofthe Jews in Israel. The Soviets could not, therefore.
openly support the founding ofthe state of Israel. Thus, the zhdanovschina from 1949 to
1953 made Jews the most widely persecuted ethnic minority in the USSR,as Jewish
newspapers, cultural facilities, schools, radio stations, and theaters were closed down
72

with a much greater effect than on other minority groups.

Many prominent Jewish

writers and intellectuals were arrested and executed, while others died in prison camps or
due to torture. Twenty-five well-known Jewish writers were secretly tried and executed
in Moscow in July 1952 on trumped up charges that they had plotted to establish a Jewish
73

State on the Crimean peninsula,

Zionist “witch-hunts” ensued in 1952 and into 1953 in

universities, factories, and government organs, and newspapers such as Pravda carried
overtly anti-Semitic propaganda. Verbal abuse towards Jews became common in the
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streets.

The culmination ofthis Jewish pogrom was the so called “Doctor’s Plot” of

January, 1953, when seven prominent Jewish doctors were charged with murdering a
75

number of Soviet officials as well as plotting a number of other murders.

These actions

by the Soviet government signaled what would likely have been a mass deportation of
Jews had Stalin not died in 1953.

Soviet Nationalities Policy under Khrushchev
Nikita Khrushchev’s Secret Speech in February of 1956 paved the way for the socalled ‘thaw’ during which many of Stalin’s misdeeds were revealed to a stunned Soviet
public. Thereafter, a wide range of Stalinist policies were curbed significantly, including
his extreme nationalities policies in place since the mid 1930s. Khrushchev was highly
critical of Stalin’s mass deportation ofethnic groups, and many Latvians, Lithuanians,
and Estonians were allowed to return to their homelands.
Khrushchev’s Program included efforts to increase interaction among the various
ethnic groups of the USSR. Increased trade and internal migration between the republics
were allowed, and the party apparatus stepped up its Russian language instruction in
schools across the Soviet Union while allowing ethnic minorities to continue the usage of
76

their respective languages.

Up until the end of 1957, Khrushchev’s nationality policies seemed to resemble
those of the 1920s and korenizatsia. Economic and administrative decentralization were
the core of Khrushchev’s early nationality policies. The linguistic and educational
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measures of korenizatsia, however, would not be as strongly emphasized under
Khrushchev as they had been in the late 1920s and early 1930s.
By 1958, Khrushchev’s desire to expand the dominance ofthe Russian language
led the Soviet government to scale back any policies which seemed to hearken back to
77

the korenizatsia period.

Moreover, by the 1960s, local administrative bodies in the

autonomous republics and national republics had to abandon the usage oftheir native
languages in their correspondences and converting them to Russian. This had a
78

widespread impact on the regional academia and legal system.
Khrushchev’s revival of Russification stemmed from instances of ethnic tension
that had begun to surface in the early years of his rule. Even before Khruschev’s Secret
Speech, several Caucasian groups such as the Ingush and the Chechens had seized upon
the window of opportunity after Stalin’s death and had begun returning to their
homelands without the Soviet government’s approval. Despite numerous arrests, the
Soviet regime could not stop the influx ofthousands of Caucasians, and was ultimately
forced to relent. As a result, the Chechen-Ingush ASSR was reestablished by 1957, along
with numerous other autonomous regions in the Caucasus. Not surprisingly, ethnic
tensions arose when many Caucasians returned to find that, in their absence, much of
their former territory had been taken over by Great Russians. There was one such major
incident of ethnic conflict in Grozny, the capital of Chechnya, in which Great Russians
79

rioted after a Russian sailor was beaten to death by an Ingush,

Instances such as this

undoubtedly highlight the continued existence of ethnic tension despite governmental
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attempts to maintain harmony among the various national groups. In response, the
Soviets attempted to settle this tension through Russification.
Khrushchev’s Russification campaign included educational reforms aimed at
advancing the Russian language at the expense of national languages. After 1956, ethnic
minorities were allowed greater freedom to study their national languages under the basic
“national in form, socialist in content” formula. However, by the time ofthe 22"*^ Party
Congress in 1962, Khrushchev had come to support the teaching of Russian as a “second
native language” among ethnic groups. The various non-Russian languages ofthe USSR
were categorized and those deemed to be “dying” were gradually phased out in regional
school networks. Perhaps the most crucial policy shift in terms of language education
came in the Education Reform Laws of 1958-1959, which abolished mandatory
instruction in national languages and gave non-Russian parents the right to choose the
language of instruction for their children. In practice, this new policy greatly lowered the
stature of ethnic languages vis-^-vis Russian: languages such as Chuvash and Karelian
ceased to be the primary languages in their respective schools.
Many leaders of national republics rejected the laws because they seemed to
create a Great Russian double standard: the Education Reform Laws essentially made the
study of the Russian language mandatory in national language schools, yet national
languages were made optional for Russian language schools. In essence, non-Russian
students in both the RSFSR and the republics were expected to study the Russian
language, yet Great Russian students living in republics other than the RSFSR were
expected only to study in Russian. Georgian official I. V. Abashidze voiced this opinion
in December, 1958, declaring, “Knowledge ofthe local language is a powerful moral
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factor in creating brotherly unity among people of different nationalities...We think local
)»80

languages must be required subjects in all curricula in all ofthe republics’ schools.
Ukrainian Communist Party Secretary S. V. Chervonenko seconded this opinion, stating,
“Many years of experience with national education in the republics show that obligatory
Russian classes and the local language classes have proven to be a complete
>>81

success...Resolving the issue differently seems like a step backwards,

These appeals

fell on deaf ears, however, as the Khrushchev regime pushed ahead with its educational
reforms.
Those republics who dared to openly resist these Education Reforms, such as
Latvia and Azerbaijan, saw their Communist Parties purged in the summer of 1959.
Khrushchev’s first victim, Turkmenian Party Chiefs. Babaev, was purged a year earlier
for complaining that ''korenizatsia was not progressing fast enough,” since only 18.8
percent of the students at the republic’s six technical universities were of Turkmen
82

descent.

Ethnic minorities also became dissatisfied that the reforms did not address the

growing linguistic divide between themselves and Great Russians. Virtually all of the
Union Republics continued to offer mandatory instruction in Russian as well as in the
respective national languages in most schools despite the official rhetoric. There
remained, however, a clear and undeniable double standard which continued to anger
many ethnic minorities in that Great Russians living in areas populated largely by other
ethnic groups generally made little effort to learn the national language ofthat area.
According to the 1970 Census, only 3 percent of Great Russians, or 3.8 million
individuals, claimed fluency in another Soviet language, with 2.37 million ofthese
80
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claiming fluency in Ukrainian.

Linguistic Russification can thus be seen as a persistent,

tangible threat for ethnic minorities. Moreover, the purges of 1958-1959 sent a clear
84

signal to minority groups that the period of concessions was over.
The official ideological shift in nationalities policy came at the Twenty-Second
Party Congress in 1962 as Khrushchev blatantly contradicted many of his statements on
nationalities policy in 1957. Khrushchev stated before the Twenty-Second Congress that,
“In the USSR, a new historical community of people of different nationalities and
who share common characteristics has arisen - the Soviet People [Sovetskii
narod]. These nationalities share a common socialist motherland, the USSR; a
common economic base, the socialist economy; a common class structure; a
common philosophy, Marxism-Leninism; a common goal, the development of
communism; and many common spiritual and psychological features.”^^
Hereafter, the two “dialectic” practices ofthe “universal development of every nation”
and “drawing together ofthe socialist nations,” were characterized as “interrelated.
progressive tendencies.” Previously, Soviet ideology had presumed that the two
processes would occur in two distinct yet consecutive periods, while after 1962, these
processes were considered simultaneous. This new ideology was “well-suited to
^>86

legitimize assimilatory policy.

Jeremy Azrael asserts that the dual processes of drawing nations together while
maintaining and developing national identities essentially locked the Soviet leadership
after Stalin into an unyielding contradiction. Azreal asks,“How could [the Soviet
leadership] establish a new legitimacy, which was to be based on a consensus developed
through the recognition of national aspirations, while simultaneously asserting that the
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nations of the USSR were moving toward fusion?”*’ This contradiction was the focal
point of much of the dialogue in government circles following the death of Stalin, which
had expanded to include many more interest groups, many of which promoted national
interests. Furthermore, the Party after Stalin’s death was no longer a “coherent body with
a single voice,” but “rather a conglomeration of various interests with conflicting
views.’.88 Under Khrushchev, the Party recruitment apparatus began to seek out cadres
more for their technical skills than for their allegiance to ideology. These new technical
elites were assigned in particularly high numbers to the national peripheries rather than
the central Party organs. In addition, many ofthese ‘technocrats’ often made decisions
based on reality rather than commitment to the Party position. As a result, conflict within
the Party arose not only in Moscow, but between Moscow and the national republics as
well.89
A major element of Khrushchev’s early nationality policy was to entrust greater
economic autonomy to the national republics. However, Khrushchev recognized the
dangers posed by his earlier policies ofeconomic decentralization, and after 1962 he
began to implement recentralization measures. Simon argues that the transfer of
economic administration to the republics greatly endangered a “Party dictatorship
conceived to be centralized.»90 Likewise, economic decentralization seemed to
contribute to growing self confidence among the national republics and bolstered
propoganda in favor of national and territorial autonomy. Under the decentralized
economic structure, many republics managed to meet and often surpass their quotas for
87
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their local supplies, yet frequently fell drastically short of meeting their quotas for
delivery to the All-Union fund. For instance, in 1959, the Kazakh SSR met 111 percent
of its meat production quota, yet only delivered 28 percent of its quota to the All-Union
fund while meeting 95 percent of its local quota.^' Similarly, the Ukrainian SSR met 95
percent of its meat quota and filled 92 percent of its own local quota, yet only delivered
92

47 percent of its quota for the All-Union fund.
In response, Khrushchev in 1963 created a number ofeconomic councils to
supervise and coordinate the smaller economic administrative bodies in the republics, as
well as the Supreme Economic Council ofthe USSR which was the “supreme state organ
controlling industry and construction.” This strategy allowed Khrushchev to reassert
economic control over the republics without stripping them oftheir recently won
competencies. The convoluted economic bureaucracy prompted a large degree of
antagonism among the various bodies, providing a convenient context for Brezhnev to
later dissolve all of the economic councils created under Khrushchev and assert a more
heavily centralized network of economic administration.^^ The temporary acquiescence
by the Soviet government of a significant degree ofeconomic autonomy to the national
republics only to rescind shortly thereafter parallels the vacillation towards cultural
policies. Since most republics were able to better meet their domestic needs when given
greater economic autonomy, there was a greater tendency to resist economic
recentralization among the republics.
In reaction to the growing ethnic dissent arising out of resistance to Russification
and economic recentralization, the Soviet regime under Khrushchev brutally repressed all
91
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national self determination movements based on ethnic and/or linguistic identities. In
1962, for instance, a group of Ukrainian intellectuals were convicted of high treason for
publishing a leaflet calling for Ukrainians to rise up and secede from the USSR.
Similarly, many high ranking party officials in republics such as Latvia and Kazakhstan
»94

were purged for ‘‘showing indulgences toward nationalist sentiments.

Ronald Suny

points out that during the Khrushchev period the USSR “maintained itselfthrough the
tolerance of diversity and local national control with the ultimate sanction ofthe threat or
use of armed force.,.95 The use of the military occurred with the brutal repression of
96

ethno-nationalist rallies in Tbilisi in 1956 and Erevan in 1965.

The Khrushchev period can thus be viewed as a period ofethnic minorities
struggling to maintain their preferential position in the early post Stalin years while at the
same time being faced with the continuous threat of brutal suppression by the Soviet
government.
That said, Zisserman-Brodsky asserts that Khrushchev brought about a sort of
“human dimension” to the political culture in the Soviet Union. This, she argues, was
central in the ethnic revival in the years following Stalin. It was after Khrushchev that
there was a continual public concern over human rights and civil liberties. Thus, the
public environment created under Khrushchev seemed to set forth a precedent under
which ethnic minorities had more flexibility and a better case for their nationalist causes.
While Soviet nationality policy under Khrushchev was not as favorable toward national
republics as in the early Bolshevik period, it was clearly a step towards greater leniency.
Zisserman-Brodsky goes so far as to conclude that the “sip offreedom” permitted under
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Khrushchev after the death of Stalin “proved to be fatal for the Soviet Empire.

The

temporary control given to national elites over economic decision-making, the resurgence
of national languages being taught in republic schools, the general sense ofa more
benevolent government, and most importantly, the ongoing contradictory nationalities
policies espoused by the Soviet leadership, all worked to undermine the cohesion ofthe
Soviet republics.
Most of the underground organizations still in existence during the late 1980s first
„98

assembled during the “sip of freedom.

It was at this time that ethnic minorities first

produced outspoken critics of official nationality policies and practices. These critics
managed not only to replenish there own ranks in the face of hundreds, if not thousands
of arrests, but also to establish dynamic and resilient dissident organizations, ranging
from clandestine parties, through editorial boards for the preparation of TQguXox samizdat,
or underground journals, to networks for the public circulation of programs, petitions.
„99

and letters of protest.

These organizations played a significant role in undermining the

Soviet government all the way up to the collapse in 1991.

The Brezhnev Period: Another ‘Great Retreat?’
Militant separatist activity waned under the leadership ofLeonid Brezhnev, who
assumed power after Khrushchev’s fall from grace in the mid 1960s. Formerly operating
partisan armies such as the UFA,or Ukrainian Insurgent Army, were silenced during
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Brezhnev's rule.

Ethno-nationalist dissidence seemed to be at such a low level that

Brezhnev announced during a ceremony commemorating the USSR’s fiftieth anniversary
in 1972 that, “the national question, as it has come down to us from the past, has been
resolved completely, definitely, and irrevocably.

101

While few believed that any sort of

ethno-nationalist uprising could succeed during this period due to the enormity of Soviet
military strength, a variety of passive ethno-cultural conflicts persisted under Brezhnev.
Ongoing disputes over things such as linguistic and cultural expression and religious
intolerance continued to unsettle many ethnic minority groups. Moreover, unequal
distribution of investment in various autonomous regions and national republics, the right
of return for exiled political opponents, and a lack of minority representation in elite
posts further revived divisions between the Great Russians and the various ethnic
minorities.102
Compounding these disputes was yet another period of Russification. One policy
pursued under the Brezhnev regime that ultimately spread ethno-nationalist discontent
was a continuation of Khrushchev’s campaign to impose on ethnic minorities a
103

homogenous Sovetskii narod.

Any type ofcultural expression which was thought to

espouse ethnic nationalism was bitterly condemned under Brezhnev. The Soviets
outlawed traditional Ukrainian dress in the 1970s, as well as customary Belorussian
104

funeral ceremonies known as dzyady.

The government also eliminated the national

Ligo festival of Latvia, during which Latvians traditionally laid flowers at the monument
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to Liberty, after they proclaimed it a “bourgeois nationalist” festival,

Soviet officials

even condemned certain types of music as openly nationalist, as was the case with the
106

prohibition of the dombre, the national instrument ofthe Kazakhs,

These incidents

indicate an abandoning of the earlier cultural autonomy provided under korenizatsia
together with the attempt to replace national cultures through a Russification campaign.
The 1970 census illustrated several demographic developments that revealed
escalating challenges to Soviet attempts to construct a Sovetskii narod. In addition to
showing the lack of Great Russians claiming fluency in other Soviet languages as well as
a decline in the use of Russian by ethnic minorities, the 1970 census revealed that a
demographic stagnation ofthe Great Russians was met with a population explosion in
Central Asia and the Caucasus between 1959 and 1970. For instance, among Uzbeks
there was a population increase from just over 6 million in 1959 to about 9.2 million in
107

1970, a 52.8 percent increase,

The Kazakhs and Tadzhiks experienced similarly high

population growth rates over the same period, with 46.3 percent and 52.9 percent,
108

respectively.

The Azeri, Georgians, Armenians, Kirgiz, and Turkmen all showed high

growth rates from 1959 to 1970 ranging from 20.2 percent all the way up to 52.2
109

percent.

These high growth rates among the peoples ofthe Caucasus and Central Asia

contrast sharply with that of the Great Russians over the 1959-1970 period, as the growth
110

rate among Russians totaled 13 percent,

In the following decade, the situation would

not become any more favorable for those hoping for a Russified Sovetskii narod. While

105

Khazanov, 56.
Ibid, 57.
107
Simon, 372.
108
Ibid.
109
Ibid.
110
Ibid.
106

Wheat 33

the growth rates of the peoples of Central Asia and the Caucasus clearly slowed down
between 1970 and 1979, ranging from 16.6 percent among Georgians to 35.7 among
Tadzhiks, the growth rate of the Great Russians decreased even more dramatically to 6.5
111

percent over the same period.

This population explosion, met with declining use ofthe

Russian language, must have made the task ofcreating a Sovetskii narod more difficult.
Fewer minorities over this period migrated to the RSFSR and intermarriage rates between
Great Russians and those of ethnic minority backgrounds were down.
These factors all but negated Khrushchev’s claim that the nations were fusing
together and at the same time weakened any justification for a central integrating role for
112

the Great Russian nation and language,

At the same time,” writes Azrael, “[these

factors] demonstrated the fact that nationhood was autonomous ofsocioeconomic
changes and that the future evolution ofthe USSR did not imply the future fusion of
nations.

1 13

Despite attempts by Khrushchev to assert more centralized control through

the promotion of a “Soviet people,” a more decentralized sense of nationhood appears to
have arisen during the 1960s and early 1970s.
In response to the results ofthe 1970 census, the Soviet regime during the late
1960s and throughout the 1970s revamped its efforts to broaden its Russian language
instruction among non-Russians. Brezhnev inherited this proposed solution from his
predecessor, “[a]s Khrushchev’s attempt to breathe Marxism-Leninism back to life
obviously petered out, and the demographic balance began to shift against the Great
Russians, the Russian language was thrust more and more into the role of chief
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instrument of socialization and integration,

As time passed, the goal ofconsolidating

the Soviet people under the Russian language became of increasing importance to
Brezhnev, as his education policies demonstrate.
Brezhnev's education policies aimed at expanding the role ofthe Russian
language throughout the USSR,further revitalizing an atmosphere of Russification. The
double standard established under Khrushchev continued under Brezhnev: Russians had
their own schools regardless of which republic they resided in, whereas ethnic minorities
residing in the RSFSR had no choice but to attend Russian-language schools. Minority
»115

groups were thus “doomed to acculturation and de-ethnization.

Even more insulting

to ethnic minority groups was praising the Great Russians in official Soviet rhetoric
during the Brezhnev period. The Soviets promoted Russian as the language ofthe
October Revolution and of Lenin, in addition to proclaiming it as the language ofthe
«116

Communist future and “the powerful means for spiritual integration.

Moreover,the

Soviet official line maintained that non-Russians had a “craving” for the Russian
language and that it was an “objective, historical factor,” that the Russian nation had
»117

“gained the love and respect of all ofthe toilers,

A certain degree of Great Russian

arrogance in the official Party line unquestionably existed, giving credence to the
perceived threat of renewed Russification among ethnic minorities.
Brezhnev’s language policy translated into a further reduction ofthe number of
schools instructing in languages other than Russian. This process was implemented
across the entire USSR, but those within the RSFSR were most heavily affected. In the
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early 60s under Khrushchev, there were 47 languages used as the means of instruction
118

other than Russian. By 1982, that number had fallen to 16.

Even in the few non-

Russian language schools, native language instruction was used only in the lowest grades,
and the time dedicated Russian language study overall in the late 1970s comprised about
119

14 to 17 percent of the average school day.

Whereas Khrushchev’s regime had been

tolerant of those republics that did not fully conform to the Party’s policies on education,
Brezhnev forced all republics to comply. Estonia and Lithuania finally relenting in 1980
120

and 1981, respectively, to introduce Russian language study in first grade classes.
Dissatisfaction grew among many ethnic minorities over the Russification oftheir
national political elites during the Brezhnev period. One dissident Moldovan author,
Chingiz Aitmatov, criticized officials who he felt to be “a special type of
demagogue...who almost made his prestigious profession extolling the Russian language
121

95

and depreciating his own in appropriate and inappropriate situations,

One Bashkir

worker lamented,“our leadership and deputies ofthe Bashkir ASSR cringed and
groveled before chauvinism, most of all worrying about their own privileged positions;
for them it was disgraceful to give a speech even once on television or radio in the
99122

Bashkir language.

A disgruntled Tatar complained,“Many leaders to this day never
,^123

give speeches in their native languages; some ofthem don’t even speak it.

These

concerns seemed to be ignored, however, as Soviet language policy under Brezhnev

118

Kriendler, 54.
Ibid.
120
Ibid, 54.
121
Khazanov, 59.
122
Ibid.
123
Ibid.
I 19

Wheat 36

unmistakably favored the Russian language. Regional leaders were expected to follow
suit and promote the Russian language as well.
In addition to addressing Khrushchev’s supposed failures in promoting the
Russian language, Brezhnev also sought to tackle what the Soviet leadership perceived to
be unsatisfactory migration rates. Brezhnev hoped to increase the number of Great
Russians residing in the republics in order to facilitate his Russification campaign among
ethnic minority groups. In its rhetoric, the Soviet government had always maintained that
the migration of peoples of different ethnic backgrounds within the Soviet Union was a
positive mechanism for the “internationalization” ofthe Soviet peoples. In reality, this
internal migration was a practical political tool for the Soviet regime to create loyal
groups in the republics to make Russification easier while at the same time strengthening
control in the periphery. The upshot of internal migration meant that by the late 1980s,
only Armenia maintained ethnic homogeneity with 90% ofthe population being
Armenian. In Kazakhstan and Kirgizia, the respective indigenous ethnic groups no
longer constituted a majority, and the same held true for 13 ofthe 20 autonomous
124

republics of the USSR.
125

and 1988.

The non-Estonian population of Estonia tripled between 1959

It comes as no wonder, then, that these ethnic groups came to feel

threatened by the rapid, ongoing influx of Great Russians into the republics.
The Brezhnev government institutionalized cultural Russification in the mid1970s. With its policy known as etnokulturovedenia, the Soviet government hoped to
overcome so-called “national barriers” by passing specific elements of Russian culture on
to ethnic groups. Russian teachers were to “immerse students in the Russian spiritual
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world and promote 'a gradual merging and ultimately also integration within the
framework of a common socialist culture.,,,126 Under etnokulturovedenia Soviet
researchers studied cultural differences among the various nationalities, such as different
takes on family values and national symbolism, and made proposals on how to fill in
cultural voids and modify views that they more closely resembled those ofGreat
127

Russians.

Cultural Russification added to the dissent among the republics, along with

mounting numbers of ethnic Russians migrating into the republics and increased
linguistic Russification.
Ethnic tensions boiled over in 1970 in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, over a soccer match
between a team from Moscow and a local Uzbek one. Three days of demonstrations
ensued, with students marching and chanting “Russians go home!” and “Uzbekistan is for
!28

>9

the Uzbeks!

There was a surprising degree ofsympathy for the protesters exhibited
129

by the Uzbek police, according to eyewitness accounts.

While traveling throughout the

Soviet republics during the mid- 1970s, one Soviet historian frequently heard among nonRussian intelligentsia members the slogan,“If by the 21®* century we will be forced to
forget our native language and convert to Russian, our children and grandchildren will
„130

with even greater reason write anti-Russian slogans in Russian,

In Georgia, the

people staged mass demonstrations against linguistic Russification in 1978, with
„I31

protesters chanting,“Give us back our language!

These protests led to the

preservation of a provision in the Georgian constitution that defended the status ofthe
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Georgian language in the republic’s schools. Similar protests against linguistic
Russification look place in the Baltic republics during the late 1970s, although with less
success. 132 While eihno-nationalist discontent was by and large silenced during the early
Brezhnev period, by the late 1970s and early 1980s, dissent in the republics was
becoming evident once again.
Soviet leaders in the Brezhnev period vastly overestimated their successes in
terms of building a cohesive, multiethnic nation-state. While ethno-nationalist dissent
was less evident under Brezhnev than under any other period of Soviet history, ethnic
minorities nonetheless continued to resist Russification tactics. With respect to Central
Asia, historian Walter Kemp points out that Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders were
rather naive in supposing that hundreds of years of“brilliant Irano-Turkic-Islamic
133

culture” could be replaced with a hollow Soviet culture in a mere seventy years.

Reform, Nationalism, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union
Yuri Andropov, an aging Politburo veteran, came to power following the death of
Brezhnev in 1982 determined to solve the problems of mismanagement and lack of
productivity in the Soviet republics. Andropov attributed these problems to regional
leaders. He believed that a number ofthese leaders were attempting to subvert Soviet
policies of which they did not approve. Andropov accused other republic leaders of
trying to procure more central government funds for their respective republics by corrupt
means. While Andropov was unable to create a comprehensive plan to address these
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problems before his death, he did make an important contribution to the Soviet regime’s
position on the nationalities question. Andropov once declared.
The successes in resolving the nationalities question certainly do not mean that all
of the problems engendered by the very fact of life and work of numerous nations
and nationalities in the framework of a single nation-state have disappeared. This
is hardly possible as long as nations exist, as long as there are national
distinctions. And they will exist for a long time, much longer than class
134
distinctions.
Andropov thus admitted that there would be ethno-nationalist discontent as long
as the Soviet Union allowed for the expression of nationalist identities, and he was the
first Soviet official to state that nations and national distinctions had an identity entirely
135

separate from class,

There would be no such watershed with regard to Soviet

nationality policy during the reign of Andropov’s successor, Konstantin Chernenko.
Chernenko did not consider the nationality problem to be ofthe utmost urgency, and as
136

such, left nationality policies on the periphery of his political programs.
Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev came to power in 1985 with a spirit of enthusiasm
and reform. The overarching terms used by Gorbachev to describe his reforms were
perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost’(openness). Gorbachev found himself facing
overwhelming obstacles very early on in his leadership in spite of the apparent need for
reform in the Soviet Union. This need for reform arose out ofthe domestic and
international challenges faced by the USSR. Abroad,the Soviets were struggling with a
costly war in Afghanistan which alienated the USSR from the international community.
At home, the Soviet Union found itself facing economic stagnation as well as a crisis of
leadership that resulted from the deaths of Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko in rapid
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succession. Moreover, Gorbachev had to build a political base of support for his reform
policies with the greatest opposition to his doing so coming from “the party and state
bureaucracies in the national republics.

137

He took up Andropov’s position on

corruption, and carried on the fight against noncompliance with Party policy among
regional leaders. Gorbachev also sought to break down the networks of patronage and
138

nepotism that reinforced their positions.
Though Gorbachev correctly recognized then necessity ofreform, implementing
them proved difficult, particularly in the republics. In order to implement his reforms,
Gorbachev sought to install regional leaders in line with his platform. Several top leaders
from ethnic minority backgrounds in several national republics were replaced by
Gorbachev allies of Great Russian descent. These moves were met with ethno-nationalist
protests, as ethnic minorities sought to defend the privileges first granted to them under
korenizatsia and continued under Khrushchev and Brezhnev. In December 1986, in
Kazakhstan, for instance, demonstrations ensued after the long time Communist Party
139

chief Dinmukhammed Kunaev was replaced by the Russian Gennady Kolbin.
Gorbachev’s perestroika

campaigns after 1985 created

opportunities for national self-determination groups. While the repressive nature ofthe
Soviet regime prior to Gorbachev’s reforms undoubtedly allowed for the suppression of
any articulation of national demands or interests, the system’s ability to silence critics
was effectively curtailed under perestroika. The abolition ofthe nomenklatura, the
system that gave Communist Party officials the sole right to appoint leaders to key
economic, social and military positions, undercut the Communist Party. The Communist
137
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Party lost much of its raison d'etre in the eyes of party members and non-members alike
without the function of delegating jobs and positions. The deterioration ofthe
Communist Party provided an opening for alternative political groups, including those in
140

favor of ethno-national sovereignty.

The implementation ofglasmst'also weakened the Soviet government’s control
over critics and proponents of national self-determination movements. Although central
control over the supposed ‘freedom ofspeech’ afforded to Soviet citizens under g/ar5«o.y/’
was intended to keep radical discontent under control, critics were still able to voice their
opinions. Such open dissidence further undermined the Communist Party’s already
141

waning legitimacy.

The ability to criticize and speak out under Gorbachev’s

perestroika and glasnost’ provided ethnic minorities with an opening to voice their longquieted discontent. Suny argues that Gorbachev appears to have believed in the fictional
142

unity of a Sovetskii narod, a notion introduced under Khrushchev,

Therefore, the

argument goes, he did little to respond to the demands ofthe separatist ethnic minority
factions. Moreover, Gorbachev’s perpetual refusal to return to the violently repressive
measures of his predecessors removed the element offear from many ethno-nationalist
groups seeking sovereignty. Thus,the Gorbachev era provided a window ofopportunity
for ethno-nationalist independence movements to develop.
One area in which criticism became widespread was in the longstanding Russian
language policy in education. In particular, many ofthe national language protests ofthe
1980s pushed for the abolition ofthe “free choice” provisions ofthe 1958-1959
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Education Reform Laws.

Resistance to the resumption and expansion of obligatory

Russian language curriculum laid the groundwork for the ethno-nationalist calls for
144

cultural revival during the giasnost' period.

Many ofthe ethno-nationalist leaders,

including Levon Ter Petrosyan of Armenia,Zviad Gamsakhurdia of Georgia, and Ivan
Drach of Ukraine, pushed for national sovereignty during the breakup of 1991 and were
heavily influenced by the repressive era of Russification that marked the late 1960s to the
145

early 1980s.

One ethno-nationalist dissident, Belorussian Mikhail Kukobaka,traces

his revolutionary roots to this linguistic repression ofthe late 1960s as he writes,
1 sighted an inscription on a turnpike. Twenty-five years ago it was written in
Byelorussian with the Russian translation below. Now the Byelorussian phrase
has disappeared. To my surprise, this offended me. Suddenly, I realized that I am
a Byelorussian. From time immemorial my forefathers have lived here, and this
land consists of the remains ofcountless generations of my kinsmen. 1, their
descendent, have an undeniable right not only to this land but also to my native
language, the right to be Byelorussian.
According to Soviet philosopher Grigorii Pomerants,“Nationality, the only
officially recognized distinction between Soviet citizens, has become a leading principle
»147

of political organization...Nationalities have turned into political parties.
Indeed, ethno-nationalist separatist movements appeared in full force by early
1990. In March of that year, for instance, Lithuania’s legislature had declared
independence, while numerous so-called “salvation committees” sprang up across the
Baltics.148 In Ukraine, a number of independent political parties were established in
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1990, distancing Kiev from Moscow. Among these were the Liberal-Democratic Party,
149

the Democratic Party of Ukraine, and the Popular Movement for Reconstruction.
Dina Zisserman-Brodsky uses the term relative depravation to define the primary
motivating causes for the ethno-nationalist separatist movements that helped bring about
the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991. Relative depravation can be characterized as either
egoistic or fraternal, with the former encompassing personal discontent arising when an
individual compares his or her own situation to that of outside individuals, and the latter
dealing with social discontent resulting when an individual compares the situation of his
150

or her group as a whole to that of an outside group.

The primary categories of relative

depravation explored by Zisserman-Brodsky are political deprivation, status deprivation
and patterns of ethnic domination, as well as forms ofeconomic, environmental.
territorial, religious, cultural and linguistic deprivation.
Political depravation came first and foremost from frustration with the fictitious
notion of“national sovereignty” which the Soviet leadership trumpeted. Many ethnic
groups claimed to no avail a right to secession that Lenin and other early Bolsheviks
supported. Moreover, areas forcibly incorporated into the USSR such as Georgia and the
Baltics considered themselves “under occupation” according to various underground
151

dissident publications known as samizdat.

Another form of relative depravation noted

by these samizdat was that of ethnic domination at the hands ofthe Great Russians, a
complaint that focused on the influx of Russians into areas populated by ethnic minorities
and preferential treatment towards Russians in terms of delegating positions of power.
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For instance, one samizdat from Latvia laments that “all leading positions — all party.
«152

State and economic department head positions — were given to Russian newcomers.
Some samizdat authors alleged economic depravation at the hands ofthe
Russians. M. Sahaidak criticized the Soviet economic policy as “predatory” while

alleging that although Ukraine in the mid 1970s contributed to 23 percent ofthe USSR’s
153

exports, it received only fewer than 15 percent of its imports.

These types of

grievances are supported by evidence showing that by the 1980s, every republic in the
154

USSR experienced a trade deficit with the RSFSR except Armenia.

In terms of

government spending, the 1988 Soviet budget for social needs totaled 1308 rubles per
155

capita in Estonia, but only 212 rubles per capita in Tataria.

There were similar protests

to what was believed to be environmental deprivation, as two samizdat authors in
Georgia and Azerbaijan claimed that Russians sought to exhaust oil supplies first in
regions dominated by Turkic peoples. Even more protests arose from individuals in
Armenia who sought to remove environmentally harmful nuclear and chemical facilities.
156

Staffed largely by Russians, from their territory.

With regards to religious depravation, Georgian dissident Zviad Gamsakhurdia
cited Moscow’s repressive control over the Georgian Orthodox Church as one of his
movement’s primary grievances, while strong resistance was felt to the repression ofthe
Catholic Church in Lithuania.157 The Soviets also dissolved independent churches in
Ukraine, as noted in M. Sahadiak’s 1974 samizdat titled “Ethnocide ofthe Ukrainians in
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the USSR." Sahadiak considered the liquidation ofthe Ukrainian Autocephalous Church
and of the West Ukrainian Uniate Church in the 1930s and 1940s to be part of
>«IS8

“Moscow’s struggle against the Ukrainian Church,

Other samizdat lamented the

contradiction between oppression of so called national religions, and the promotion ofthe
dominant group’s religion. In Azerbaijan, for instance, the dominant Azerbaijani
authorities forbade the opening of a Georgian Orthodox Church while allowing the free
159

practice of Islam.

In terms of territorial depravation, a 1966 samizdat by S.

Karavansky listed a number of“deliberate mistakes” in drawing boundary lines. One
such instance involved areas of the Smolensk and Briansk oblasts populated mostly by
160

Byelorussians being allocated to the RSFSR.

In another example, the Ulyanovsk and

Orenburg oblasts populated mostly by Tatars were not made part ofthe Tatar
Autonomous Republic, but were instead assigned to the RSFSR. One anonymously
published samizdat titled Petition to Brezhnev by several Georgians living in areas of
Azerbaijan argued that those lands had been illegally annexed to the Azerbaijan SSR
despite the fact that “this was Georgian land” and that “Georgians constituted the
majority of the population.

Cultural and linguistic depravation can be readily seen in

the Russification campaigns in non-Russian classrooms.
Of all of the Soviet regions, the Baltic republics and the Caucasus displayed the
greatest nationalist discontent in the years leading up to the collapse of 1991. In 1978,
mass demonstrations succeeded in blocking a proposed constitutional amendment which
would have designated Russian as an official language of Georgia. Ten years later, in
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November 1988, mass protests and student-led hunger strikes again broke out in Georgia
in opposition to \ et another constitutional amendment which the protesters felt
162

compromised the national sovereignty of the Georgian Republic.

By April 1989,

demonstrators in Georgia had grown bold enough to stage a pro-independence rally. It
was met with a military barrage that resulted in the deaths of nineteen protesters as well
as the wounding of hundreds more. The attempt to suppress the nationalist protests
backfired, as many moderate Georgians became more sympathetic to ethno-nationalist
leaders such as Merad Kostava and their causes.163 The Georgian case provides a perfect
example of Soviet ethnic minorities struggling to defend privileges granted under
korenizatsia. The proposed amendments threatened the longstanding right to have the
Georgian language as the sole official state language. This right came under fire by the
new amendment, leading to mass demonstrations. The frustration that accompanied such
struggles, often along with instances of brutal repression, precipitated the evolution of
ethno-nationalism into demands for independence.
The Karabagh Conflict of February 1988, which arose over a disputed enclave
within Azerbaijan overwhelmingly populated by Armenians, proved to be even more
significant in undermining the Soviet regime’s attempts to stamp out ethno-nationalist
movements. This conflict exemplifies the failure ofthe Soviet government’s nationality
policies to bring about national unity and amity between the Azerbaijanis and the
Armenians. The source of this conflict is an example for Zisserman-Brodsky’s
‘territorial deprivation,’: the Soviet partition of Karabagh left neither Armenians nor
Azerbaijanis satisfied. Moreover,
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“[i Internal boundaries of the USSR were drawn with an eye to political
considerations, so that some territories that would have been assigned to particular
republics on the basis of historical claims or population majorities were assigned
elsewhere. I'his policy set the stage for prolonged territorial conflicts within and
between a number of republics.’*'
This problem became evident in other areas ofthe Caucasus, as well, including the
I6S

dispute between the Georgians and the Abkhazians.
Armenians within Karabagh felt as though Azerbaijan was intentionally impeding
the enclave’s economic development, and that Armenians were being encouraged to
emigrate so that the territory could be populated by more Azerbaijanis. In an
unprecedented move, the Karabagh soviet council voted 110 to 17 to proclaim the
166

transfer of authority over Karabagh to Armenia.

In response, Azerbaijanis took to the

streets in protest, proclaiming that Karabagh was a historical part oftheir homeland.
Before long, the conflict led to violence, as armed mobs from each side sought to exact
their frustrations on members of the opposing ethnic group. Hundreds ofthousands of
167

refugees on both sides fled their homes as a result ofthe mounting violence.

The

Soviet government soon realized that it was confronted with a mass political movement
outside of Communist Party control.
Gorbachev reacted by attempting to imprison several members ofthe Armenianled Karabagh Committee as well as some nationalist Azerbaijani leaders. He also tried to
prevent the population from political participation, unsuccessfully. Once the imprisoned
leaders were released, Armenians promptly set about “dismantling communism and

164

Chorbajian, 240.
Ibid, 238-239.
166
Suny, 133-134.
167
Stephen Kotkin, Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, /970-2000(Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2001)72
165

Wheat 48
..16S

creating an Armenian democracy,

Once it became clear that his earlier measures had

not been effective. Gorbachev saw no choice but to send in the military to disband the
growing nationalist movement in Azerbaijan. He did so reluctantly in January 1990.
Stephen Kotkin argues, however, that Gorbachev’s commitment to “humane socialism”
and his refusal to suppress decisively ethno-nationalist elements in Azerbaijan did much
more harm to the Soviet regime than good. Not only did Gorbachev not use the military
44

swiftly and massively." he also invited several nationalist leaders to join the new

regional government apparatuses, further undermining the Soviet efforts to bring peace in
KW

the Caucasus.

Because of the Karabagh incident, Armenian leaders decided to declare
independence in 1990 follow ing earlier declarations of independence by Lithuania, the
170

Russian Republic, Ukraine, Belorussia, and Moldova,

The Karabagh incident shows

the extent to which national self-awareness persisted into the 1980s despite decades of
effort by the Soviet government to bring about a sense of unity under the concept ofa
Sovetskii narod. The conflict highlighted the problem ofterritorial deprivation and
exposed the inability of the Soviet regime to maintain order in the republics.
Kotkin argues that one of the primary ways in which nationalism influenced the
collapse of the USSR was that it provided a context for regional leaders to seize power
for themselves. For instance, while Ukrainian parliamentary leader Leonid Kravchuk at
first strongly opposed devolution in the USSR, but then responded rather quickly to the
various student protests that rocked Kiev in 1990 supporting Ukrainian sovereignty.
When the second draft of the Union Treaty of 1991 came before Kravchuk, he rejected it
168
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and thereby positioned himself as the leading presidential candidate for an independent
Ukraine. Similarly, the chairman of the Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet Nursultan Nazarbaev
rejected the post of Vice President of the USSR and instead rallied national support
which he hoped would translate into a successful presidential run in post-Soviet
171

Kazakhstan.

Nazerbaev had stressed for quite some time the need for greater

economic autonomy from the Soviet Union, as Kazakhstan, along with Kirgizia,
depended most heavily on the central treasury. Nazerbaev hoped to lead a series of
economic reforms in Kazakhstan following the South Korean model of development, but
such reforms would be impossible under the framework ofthe USSR.*’^ Nazerbaev
therefore had an obvious personal interest in Kazakh independence from the Soviet
Union.
Separatists such as Kravchuk and Nazarbaev were provided ammunition for their
nationalist causes by Gorbachev. The Soviet premier never clearly stated what would
happen in the event of a breakaway by one ofthe Soviet republics, and after Soviet troops
opened fire in Georgia in 1989, and again in Lithuania in 1991, many moderates in those
173

republics joined the nationalist separatist movements.

A rising tide in ethno-nationalist

sentiment caused by the Soviet government’s intermittent use of violence on led regional
elites to jump on the separatist bandwagons. Since leaders such as Kravchuk supported
independence movements only after immense public pressure, the ethnic nationalism
expressed during the late 1980s and early 1990s could not have been created by the
regional elite in any sort of“power grab.” Rather, these movements resulted from long-
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held collective discontent among ethnic minority groups due to the various forms of
relative deprivation at the hands ofthe Great Russians.
Kravchuk and Nazerbaev may indeed have been instrumentalists, in the sense that
they believed the ethnic identities oftheir respective republics could be shaped to meet
their political goals. There is, however, a multitude of earlier samizdat publications and
first-hand accounts that testify to long-standing primordial nationalism in the republics.
There is also a lack of evidence to suggest that these leaders actively promoted a
previously unseen identity in the months leading up to the collapse ofthe USSR. Thus,
these regional elite must have simply ridden the resurging wave of primordial nationalism
in the late 1980s and early 1990s and channeled it to suit their political ends.

Part III; Conclusion
From Korenizatsia to Collapse
Brezhnev once stated that Soviet culture was “socialist in content, diverse in its
national forms and internationalist in its spirit.’ In reality, according to Walter Kemp, its
culture was “Soviet in form but meaningless in content, and that by being all things to all
people, it meant very little to almost anybody

The Soviet leadership pursued a

paradoxical approach to dealing with ethnic minorities. On the one hand, it carried out
Russification campaigns in language and culture policy along with reserving many top
military and administrative positions for individuals of Great Russian descent. On the
other hand, it implemented policies such as korenizatsia that allowed marginalized ethnic
minority groups to preserve, and in many cases develop their national identities, in
174

Kemp, 188.

Wheat 51
175

addition to obtaining administrative positions through affirmative action programs.
The Soviet nationalities policies, paradoxical as they were, failed to construct either a
multiethnic or cohesive nation-state. The cumulative disillusionment with these
vacillating policies engendered dissent among ethnic minorities, culminating in the
national self-determination movements ofthe late 1980s and early 1990s. Much of the
force behind the ethno-nationalist movements that helped bring down the Soviet Union in
1991 can be traced to the economic shortcomings of Gorbachev’s reforms as well as
continuing economic depravation in that the Soviet budget in that certain republics
176

received greater funding than did others,

Other major factors contributing to the

collapse were an escalating push for democracy, and to some degree, opportunism on the
behalves of regional elites. In addition to these factors, the various Soviet nationalities
policies, beginning with korenizatsia, also played an important role in the collapse ofthe
USSR.
Chorbajian asserts that the process offostering national identities began at its
most basic level in that “the organization of internal Soviet borders on a national basis
provided the territorial and institutional basis for the development and strengthening of
national consciousness.»177 In addition to creating a territorial boundary for each
individual ethnic in the forms of national and autonomous republics, the Soviet
government also promoted a form of national consciousness among each individual
ethnic group. This was carried out by promoting both ethnic cultures and national
languages. However, after uniting each respective ethnic group on cultural, linguistic,
and territorial grounds under korenizatsia, the instrumentalist Soviet government at
175
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various points sought to integrate these ethnics into a greater Sovetskii narod. Such
attempts were perceived among the ethnies as renewals of Russification, a clear source
for a primordialist sense of cultural deprivation. As a result, silent dissent accumulated in
many republics throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Once this dissidence was no longer
silenced under Gorbachev, ethno-nationalist dissent exploded to such an extent that a
crisis ensued in which the Soviet government could not maintain control. Thus, one of
the seeds for the collapse ofthe USSR was planted very early on: all the way back to the
1920s and the policy of korenizatsia.

Wheat 53
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